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NOTES

“A SWORD IN THE BED” : BRINGING AN END
TO THE FUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY
Brooks M. Chupp*
The procedural distinction between law and equity in the United
States is largely a historical footnote in the present day. David Dudley
Field, the notorious lawyer who advocated for the end to the distinction between law and equity, believed that there was no true substantive difference between the two disciplines beyond the different remedies that each could offer.1 But equity has not gone gentle into that
good night. For example, federal courts have recently struggled with
the scope of injunctive relief, a traditional equitable remedy.2 At present, the law grants to United States courts that hear cases in equity
only the authority of “the English Court of Chancery at the time of the
separation of the two countries [i.e., England and the United States].”3
Further, the law dictates that equitable remedies must be granted according to “traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.”4 Regardless
of whether Field’s view that equity and law are functionally no different
is correct, the principles behind the ancient system of equity still govern federal law today.
Equity has been a controversial area of the law for ages. Charles
Dickens’ novel Bleak House lampoons the system by depicting a case in
chancery that goes on for generations, consuming several people’s
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2023. Thanks to David Waddilove, Sam
Bray, and Kellen Funk for their assistance and to Burke Snowden for his gracious comments. Thanks to the NDLR editing team for their fastidious work on this Note.
1 Kellen Funk, The Union of Law and Equity: The United States, 1800–1938, in EQUITY
AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 46, 47 (John C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G. Turner
eds., 2019).
2 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that traditional principles of equity accord no right to issue a “universal injunction[]”);
United States v. Texas, 566 F. Supp. 3d 605, 645 (W.D. Tex. 2021).
3 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999).
4 Id. at 319.
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lives and livelihoods in the process.5 The Antifederalist author Brutus
complained of federal judges sitting in equity that “in their decisions
they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but
will determine, according to what appears to them.”6 Even Joseph
Story, the famed jurist and scholar of equity, thought that equity powers lent themselves easily to abuse.7 Story did not think that this was
inevitable, however, writing that “discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily, according to men’s wills and private affections; so that discretion which is executed here is to be governed by the rules of law and
equity.”8 But reformers rejected this viewpoint. They did not agree
that “discretion [was] a science,” thinking instead that law and equity
were “simply two sets of remedies, with no natural or necessary relationship between remedies and substantive rules or doctrines.”9 This
misconception underlying the merger of law and equity has led judges
and lawyers alike to misunderstand equity as either unfettered discretion to correct injustice or nothing more than a set of remedies available at law. Neither of these viewpoints is correct. Story refuted the
former, and the Supreme Court refuted the latter in Grupo Mexicano:
This expansive view of equity [i.e., that equity allows courts the
power to provide any remedy not available at law] must be rejected.
Joseph Story’s famous treatise reflects what we consider the proper
rule, both with regard to the general role of equity in our “government of laws, not of men,” and with regard to its application in the
very case before us . . . . “‘It is said,’ [Blackstone] remarks, ‘that it
is the business of a Court of Equity, in England, to abate the rigor
of the common law. But no such power is contended for.’”10

Because the merger of law and equity papered over the important,
if subtle, rules of equity, it created a serious concern that went largely
unconsidered by early proponents of merger: if lawyers and judges are
trained to think of equity as no different from law, what will happen to
the guardrails created to prevent the abuse of equitable powers? Equity is a massive and powerful field of law that dates back to the 1300s;11
5 See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Patricia Ingham ed., Broadview Press 2011)
(1853).
6 Essays of Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 417, 420 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
7 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 13 (Little, Brown, & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1836).
8 Id. (quoting Cowper v. Cowper (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 930, 942; 2 P. Wms.. 720, 753).
9 Funk, supra note 1, at 47.
10 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 321
(1999) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 12 (1836)).
11 See Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery
Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 219
(1994).
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to ask judges, who are already legal generalists, to become intimately
familiar with such an intricate system is to court disaster.
Those who called for the fusion of law and equity have, throughout the years, argued that the existence of a parallel court system for
equity would be inefficient and confusing for parties.12 While there is
limited merit to this viewpoint, the United States has been willing to
create courts of limited jurisdiction to hear cases of a highly specialized
or technical nature in other areas of the law (for example, tax and
bankruptcy). This Note argues that the specialized-courts approach is
viable as it relates to equity and that it is, in fact, preferable to the current system. This Note will also serve as a valuable resource for future
scholars of equity. Despite a recent groundswell of academic interest
in equity, no work has conducted a fifty-state survey on the history of
state equity courts, nor has any work collected sources about these
courts. This Note will provide a collection of such sources and will
feature brief discussions of certain states’ approaches to equity. Part I
will provide a collection of arguments for and against equity courts
throughout the history of the United States. Part II will provide technical details of state equity jurisdictions throughout American history
and will demonstrate (1) that total merger is less common that is commonly thought, and (2) that states that have rejected total merger have
managed to do so in a way that has been tenable for parties. Part III
will argue that the costs imposed by merger are substantial enough to
justify incurring the costs needed to undo it.
I.

AMERICAN DEBATES ON EQUITY

Americans have feuded over equity since well before the Declaration of Independence, and they show no signs of stopping. Prominent
statesmen, scholars, and lawyers have appeared on both sides of the
divide. The Antifederalists, David Dudley Field, and Roscoe Pound
opposed equity as a distinct field of law; Alexander Hamilton, Antonin
Scalia, and Henry Smith were in favor of it. As one might suspect of a
debate that has been around for over three hundred years, the debate
over equity has not always been over the same issues. Broadly speaking,
it can be broken up into three historical periods, within which the debate had a relatively uniform character: early America, where the
12 See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 270 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (saying
that an early letter from Pennsylvania contended that the establishment of equity courts
“would through [sic] everything into Confusion”); John J. Watkins, Law and Equity in Arkansas—Or, Why to Support the Proposed Judicial Article, 53 ARK. L. REV. 401, 433 (2000)
(“[T]he dual system is ‘a cumbersome relic which still breathes.’” (quoting Dalrymple v.
Simmons First Nat’l Bank of Pine Bluff, 758 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Ark. 1988))).
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debate centered around connections to the tyranny of the British
crown; the merger era, where the debate centered around the necessity—or lack thereof—of keeping law and equity separate; and the present, where the debate focuses on whether the fact that equity is antiquated is a benefit or a drawback.
Early American criticisms of equity focused on its undemocratic
nature. The colonists resented colonial chancery courts because the
chancellor was frequently also the royal governor, who sometimes ran
afoul of colonial sensibilities by abusing his discretion.13 The colonists
were also concerned that the chancery could enable royal infringement on their rights as Englishmen.14 It is little wonder why the colonists, when establishing their own judiciary systems, came to prefer unitary courts of law and equity overseen by the legislatures.15
Around the time of the passage of the Constitution, the Federalists and Antifederalists took up the issue of federal equity jurisdiction.
The Antifederalists picked up where the pre-Revolution colonists had
left off, contending that equity lent itself all to easily to abuse, that giving the federal judiciary a general power to hear cases in equity would
upset the bounds of federalism, and further, that equity itself was inherently unconfinable by any sort of principles.16 Alexander Hamilton, speaking for the Federalists, disagreed. He analyzed the ways in
which local court systems handled jury trials and equity, and concluded
that they were so disparate as to make the Antifederalists concerns irrelevant as they related to federal courts:
[I]t appears that there is a material diversity, as well in the modification as in the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases,
in the several States; and from this fact these obvious reflections
flow: first, that no general rule could have been fixed upon by the
convention which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and secondly, that more or at least as much
might have been hazarded by taking the system of any one State for

13 See Katz, supra note 12, at 278–82 (discussing a New York case in which Governor
William Cosby was accused of abusing his power as chancellor to grant a large tract of land
to political supporters).
14 Id. at 280–81 (referring to an English precedent in chancery as a “royal scheme . . .
to establish ‘a despotick Power in the King over the Rights and Liberties of the Subject’”
(quoting William Alexander et al., The Petition of Some of the Proprietors of Part of the
Lands Lately Taken out of Connecticut, and Added to the Province of New-York (Oct. 22,
1735), reprinted in N.Y. WKLY. J., Nov. 24, 1735, at CVIII)).
15 Id. at 264–65.
16 See Essays of Brutus XI, supra note 6, at 420 (“The same learned author [i.e., Blackstone] observes, ‘That equity, thus depending essentially upon each individual case, there
can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity laid down, without destroying its
very essence, and reducing it to a positive law.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 61–62 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765)).
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a standard, as by omitting a provision altogether and leaving the
matter, as it has been left, to legislative regulation. 17

Hamilton also addressed the older concerns about courts of equity, admitting that a court of equity could easily “permit the extension
of its jurisdiction to matters of law,” but arguing that attempting to
subsume equity into law would be “unproductive of the advantages
which may be derived from courts of chancery” and would “undermine the trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated for a
decision in that mode.”18
As time moved onward toward 1848, proponents of the fusion of
law and equity changed direction: the issue wasn’t that equity was inherently dangerous, it was that equity was inherently no different from
law.19 Interestingly, those fusionists argued that even if equity was created distinct from law, it “had become indistinguishable from law in its
precedent-bound jurisprudence.”20 Some fusionists even argued that
a separate equity jurisdiction was not just unnecessary, but constituted
an active encroachment on the law; indeed, at the Field Code debates
conducted in the New York legislature, New York fusionist Charles
O’Conor argued that “[t]here was not at present any such thing recognized in jurisprudence . . . which the law did not define and declare.”21 The fusionists had a powerful ally in their fight: Blackstone,
who wrote that, however law and equity may have been created, both
“are now equally artificial systems, founded in the same principles of
justice and positive law; but varied by different usages in the forms and
mode[s] of their proceedings.”22
However, as more and more states fused law and equity, opponents of fusion began to appear. Some argued that the fusion of law
and equity was unconstitutional, including both the legislature of
Iowa23 and the New York Court of Appeals.24 Judge Selden expressed
the argument succinctly in Reubens v. Joel:
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 503 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18 Id. at 505–06.
19 See Funk, supra note 1, at 56–57 (“[T]he distinction between law and equity ‘has no
foundation in the nature of things’, as Field put it. ‘Its existence is accidental, and continues till now only because we have been the slaves of habit.’” (quoting The Convention—
Reports of the Judiciary Committee, EVENING POST, Aug. 13, 1846)).
20 Id. at 57.
21 S. CROSWELL & R. SUTTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW-YORK STATE
CONVENTION, FOR THE REVISION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 443 (Albany, Albany Argus
1846).
22 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434.
23 REVISION OF 1860, CONTAINING ALL THE STATUTES OF A GENERAL NATURE OF THE
STATE OF IOWA 447 (Des Moines, Iowa, John Teesdale 1860) [hereinafter REVISION OF
1860] (discussing, though disavowing, this stance).
24 Reubens v. Joel, 13 N.Y. 488, 495 (1856).
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It is, in my judgment, clear that the legislature has not the constitutional power to reduce all actions to one homogeneous form; because it could only be done by abolishing trial by jury, with its inseparable accompaniment, compensation in damages, which would
not only conflict with art. 1, § 2 [of the New York Constitution],
which preserves trial by jury, but would in effect subvert all jurisdiction at law, as all actions would thereby be rendered equitable; or,
by abolishing trial by the court, with its appropriate incident, specific relief, which would destroy all equity jurisdiction and convert
every suit into an action at law.25

But the Court of Appeals did not carry the day. In 1848, the state
of New York formed a commission “to revise, reform, simplify, and
abridge the rules and practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of
the courts of record of this State.”26 David Dudley Field, the wellknown reformer, took a seat on this commission, and was so instrumental in shaping its reforms that the modernized code that New York
ultimately passed was commonly known as “the Field Code.”27 Among
other things, the Field Code abolished separate proceedings in law and
equity in favor of a single, streamlined system.28 The Field Code was
ultimately adopted by a majority of states, sweeping away the separate
state courts of equity.29
Even after the passage of the Field Code across the United States,
equity’s defenders continued to take the position that the Constitution
required separate proceedings in law and equity in order to preserve
the right to a trial by jury.30 This argument found friendly ears in the
former Northwest Territory and its neighbors, as states like Michigan,
Kentucky, and Iowa adopted the view.31 Different states handled this
in different ways: the Michigan Supreme Court, for example,

25 Id. at 495. Judge Selden later averred that this was “to be taken as [his own] individual opinion merely” and not controlling precedent, because procedural issues in Reubens
rendered the constitutional issue moot. N.Y. Ice Co. v. N.W. Ins. Co. of Oswego, 23 N.Y.
357, 360 (1861).
26 See Aniceto Masferrer, The Passionate Discussion Among Common Lawyers About Postbellum American Codification: An Approach to Its Legal Argumentation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 174
n.10 (2008) (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 24).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See id.; Funk, supra note 1, at 47.
30 It is important to note here that the Supreme Court has not yet incorporated the
Seventh Amendment, which guarantees a trial by jury, against the states. See Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 852 (2013) (citing
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010)). However, the “great majority
of state constitutions” have incorporated the right, so any arguments here will be equally
applicable to the Federal Constitution. See id.
31 See, e.g., REVISION OF 1860, supra note 23, at 449; Brown v. Kalamazoo Cir. Judge,
42 N.W. 827, 830 (Mich. 1889); Johnson v. Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1957).
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acknowledged that “there are various kinds of interests and controversies which cannot be left without equitable disposal without either destroying them or impairing their value” and that the right to equitable
remedies was “as sacred as the right of trial by jury.”32 The court then
addressed the Michigan state constitution’s then-new command to
merge law and equity “as far as practicable,” saying that it applied only
to “merely formal” distinctions of procedure (and not any substantive
matter) because “[a]ny change which transfers the power that belongs
to a judge to a jury, or to any other person or body, is as plain a violation of the [C]onstitution as one which should give the courts executive or legislative power vested elsewhere.”33 Other state courts agreed
with the aforementioned distinction between form or procedure and
substance. Indeed, Kentucky kept the distinction even after it abolished its chancery courts in 1891.34
In more modern times, caused in part by certain states’ refusal to
abolish their courts of chancery and their separate forms of pleading,
fusionism came again to the forefront. Supporters of merger at this
point expressed frustration with what they viewed as an ancient and
ossified system that was inefficient and wasteful.35 The fusionists also
often stressed, as Field and others did over 100 years before them, that
the distinction between law and equity was largely procedural, and that
“[t]he day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given
32 See Brown, 42 N.W. at 830.
33 Id. at 830–31. The right to a trial by jury was allegedly first called a “sword in the
bed” separating law and equity by Professor Zechariah Chafee. See Fredal v. Forster, 156
N.W.2d 606, 612 & n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (quoting an unpublished lecture of Chafee’s).
The underlying idea enjoys substantial support in the modern era. See, e.g., Thomas O.
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 451 n.134 (2003);
see also Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat’l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922) (“The most important limitation upon a federal union of the two kinds of remedies in one form of action
is the [jury trial] requirement of the Constitution . . . .”).
34 On the matter of Kentucky’s lingering distinction between law and equity, see
Holbrook, 302 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Ky. 1957) (“This Rule and other Rules we need not mention,
while permitting legal and equitable claims or defenses to be fused for purely procedural
purposes, did not abolish, and certainly were not intended to abolish, the time-honored
distinction between remedies applicable to a legal cause of action or to one sounding in
equity.”). For Kentucky’s abolition of its courts of equity, see Heller v. Heller, No. 2008-CA000113, 2009 WL 485011, at *4 n.4 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (Taylor, J., concurring in
the result only) (citing KY. CONST. of 1891, sched. 3).
35 See, e.g., Frank W. Donaldson & J. Michael Walls, Merger of Law and Equity in Alabama—Some Considerations, 33 ALA. LAW. 134, 148 (1972) (“A purpose of the rule is to remove the former expensive and time-consuming requirement of two separate suits in order
that the litigant have his jury as well as his equitable relief.”); Watkins, supra note 12, at 401
(“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”
(quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897))).
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rule be a rule of equity or a rule of common law[:] suffice it that it is a
well-established rule administered by the High Court of Justice.”36
Equity’s modern supporters, on the other hand, appeal to equity’s
broad function as a gap-filler and a corrective for the legal system.
They argue that the complexity of the modern world requires a robust
system of equity to achieve justice where law failed to foresee certain
scenarios.37 Further, they argue that equity cannot serve this function
except as a system with some level of separation from law, and that by
merging equity into law almost completely, this function is lost in the
modern age.38
II.

HISTORICAL STATE EQUITY COURTS

Although equity’s very existence was controversial in the colonial
era, equity jurisdiction in the states survived the Declaration of Independence. As the United States expanded westward, it was rare to see
true courts of chancery established in the new states, but the new states
still had equity jurisdictions and separate forms of pleading for law and
equity. But the fusionists were not satisfied with this. They argued that
fusion was necessary for a well-functioning judiciary and that retaining
separation would lead to nothing but interminable lawsuits and inefficiency. Clearly, the legal community found these arguments persuasive, because once the Field Code was passed in New York, fusion swept
the country like wildfire. But some states were not so eager to fuse
their courts, and indeed, two states even found it necessary to make
law and equity less fused for a time. Most of those states that did not
fuse their courts in the aftermath of the Field Code still maintain some
degree of separation today, suggesting that the fusionists’ dire pronouncements were overblown at least and completely false at most.
Even in the colonial era, formal chancery courts were rare.39 Cases
in equity were handled by the colonial governor (sometimes in conjunction with his council), by the legislatures, or by courts modeled on
the English Court of Chancery.40
After the Declaration of
36 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 20 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909).
37 See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050, 1056 (2021) (“[M]ultiplex interactions lead to hard-to-foresee results. It is exactly here that law . . . is at its weakest.”); Main, supra note 33, at 491 (“[T]raditional equity interfered to offer relief in cases
where common law processes were defective or too complicated.”).
38 Main, supra note 33, at 478 (“[T]he legacy of equity is unfulfilled in a unified procedural system if the procedural apparatus administering jointly the substantive principles
of law and equity is not itself subject to the moderation and correction of the jurisdiction
of equity.”).
39 Katz, supra note 12, at 262.
40 See id. at 263–64.
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Independence, the colonial governments under which those systems
of chancery were established were rapidly replaced: nine of the former
colonies ratified state constitutions within three years.41 All of these
state constitutions mention the establishment of courts,42 and seven
specifically mention courts of equity.43 As a general rule, the state constitutions, when they established tribunals, established only the highest
court, leaving the creation of inferior courts as a matter for the legislature.44 When the state legislatures did establish court systems for their
states, the ways in which they handled equity could be divided into
three broad categories45: the establishment of separate courts of chancery,46 the establishment of courts with separate law and equity “sides”
41 Gregory E. Maggs, A Guide and Index for Finding Evidence of the Original Meaning of
the U.S. Constitution in Early State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights, 98 N.C. L. REV. 779,
780, 819 (2020). Connecticut elected to follow its old colonial charter “so far as an adherence to the same will be consistent with an absolute independence,” and Rhode Island did
not pass a state constitution until 1842. Id. at 786 (quoting H.R. Res., Gen. Assemb. (Conn.
1776) (as passed Oct. 10, 1776), reprinted in THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 3 (Hartford, Case, Lockwood & Brainard Co. 1894)).
42 THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION BETWEEN THE SAID STATES;
THE TREATIES BETWEEN HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
71–72 (Philadelphia, Francis Bailey 1781) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (New York);
id. at 81. (New Jersey); id. at 95–98 (Pennsylvania); id. at 109–12 (Delaware); id. at 137–39
(Maryland); id. at 143–44 (Virginia); id. at 152 (North Carolina); id. at 167 (South Carolina); id. at 182–84 (Georgia).
43 Id. at 71–72 (New York); id. at 97 (Pennsylvania); id. at 111 (Delaware); id. at 138
(Maryland); id. at 143 (Virginia); id. at 152 (North Carolina); id. at 167 (South Carolina).
44 See id.; see also DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (J.H. Newman ed., 1912). The
earliest state constitutions occasionally refer to courts that they do not themselves establish
(for example, Massachusetts’ constitution, which discusses regulations for the probate
court) demonstrating that in some cases, the courts in existence during the colonial period
were simply retained. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 33.
45 States which were incorporated around or after the beginning of the fusion movement frequently established a unitary judiciary with no distinction between law and equity.
See, e.g., Civil Practice Act, 1866 Mont. Laws 43.
46 There were thirteen states that established separate courts of chancery at some
point after the Declaration of Independence: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
and Virginia. A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 334–50 (C.C. Clay ed.,
Tuskaloosa, Marmaduke J. Slade 1843) (Alabama); EDWARD W. GANNT, A DIGEST OF THE
STATUTES OF ARKANSAS 852–53 (Little Rock, Little Rock Printing & Publishing Co. 1874)
(Arkansas); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 14 (Delaware); LESLIE A. THOMPSON, A MANUAL
OR DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, OF A GENERAL AND PUBLIC
CHARACTER 44, 450 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1847) (Florida); 1851 Ky. Acts
99–108, 205–210 (Kentucky); RULES AND ORDERS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN 3 (J.S. & S.A. Bagg Detroit, J.S. & S.A. Bagg 1839) (Michigan); MISS.
CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 16 (Mississippi); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. VI, § 4 (New Jersey); N.Y.
CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 5 (New York); 1840 S.C. Acts 208 (South Carolina); Russell Fowler,
A History of Chancery and Its Equity: From Medieval England to Today’s Tennessee, 48 TENN. BAR
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or “divisions,”47 and the establishment of what could be called “modern” courts, featuring unified courts of law and equity with no procedural distinction between the two.48 These three forms can be thought
of jointly as a series of greater degrees of unification: separate courts
of chancery are the most separate that law and equity can ever be, a
unified court with separate forms represents a unity of place and of
judges with a division of procedure, and unified procedure is the least
J., Feb. 2012, at 20, 24 (Tennessee); 1 THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, DIGESTED AND
COMPILED 117–118 (n.p., Sereno Wright 1808) (Vermont); 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA 196 (n.p., Thomas Ritchie 1819) (Virginia).
47 There were seventeen states that originally implemented some form of a unitary
court system with (1) both equity and law powers and (2) a distinction between the two:
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Gitelman, supra note 11, at 236 (Alabama); 1821 Conn. Pub. Acts 142
(Connecticut); A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 467 (Thomas
R.R. Cobb ed., Athens, Ga., Christy, Kelsea & Burke 1851) (Georgia); THE STATUTES OF
ILLINOIS, EMBRACING ALL OF THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE 138 (Samuel H. Treat, Walter B. Scates & Robert S. Blackwell eds., Chicago, D.B. Cooke & Co 1858) (Illinois); 1843
Ind. Acts (Rev. Stat.) 831 (Indiana); 1838 Iowa Acts 130 (Iowa); 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
MAINE 213–14 (Portland, Thomas Todd & Colman, Holden & Co. 1834) (Maine); THE REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 78 (Bel Air, Md., John Cox 1859) (Maryland); 1838
Mass. Acts 498–500 (Massachusetts); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI 506
(Saint Louis, Chambers, Knapp & Co. 2d ed. 1839) (Missouri); THE REVISED STATUTES OF
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 340 (Concord, John F. Brown 1851) (New Hampshire);
ACTS OF A GENERAL NATURE, CHARTED, REVISED AND ORDERED TO BE RE-PRINTED, AT THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF OHIO 50 (P.H.
Olmstead rev. ed. 1824) (Ohio); JOHN W. PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA
425 (Philadelphia, McCarty & Davis 1831) (giving authority “as the . . . exchequer, at Westminster . . . may or can do” in Pennsylvania)); THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 101–104 (Providence, Miller & Hutchens 1822)
(Rhode Island); THE AMENDED CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA 695 (John A. Warth ed., Charleston, W. Va., Kanawha Gazette Book & Job Rooms 1884) (West Virginia); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 413 (Southport, C. Latham Sholes 1849) (Wisconsin); see
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 17 (North Carolina). Some states (e.g., Maine) granted
original jurisdiction in equity cases to the highest court in the state, though the states that
did so eventually granted equity jurisdiction to lower courts as demands on the court systems rose. See, e.g., 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF MAINE, supra at 213–14; ME. STAT. tit. 4 § 252
(2022).
48 The remaining nineteen states (Louisiana is excluded; due to its unique Code Law
system, Louisiana never had a conception of equity as the English and the other states would
have understood it) instituted a form of what this Note will refer to as the “one form” rule—
either a direct quote or a paraphrase of part II, title I, section 62 of the Field Code of New
York (originally codified at chapter 379 in the New York Code):
The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all
such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished, and, there shall be in
this state, hereafter, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of
private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. § 554 (COMM’RS PRAC. & PLEADINGS 1850).
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separate form of law and equity. Indeed, for the eight states49 which
had originally had separate courts of chancery but ultimately abolished
them, three of them united law and equity in a single court before they
united legal and equitable procedure.50
The first state to abolish the procedural distinction between law
and equity was New York, when it passed the Field Code in 1848.51 As
it relates to equity, the Field Code’s major intervention was the institution of the “one form” rule, which abolished the distinction between
legal and equitable procedure and allowed plaintiffs to plead both legal and equitable causes of action in a single form.52 Several states
adopted their own versions of the Field Code and its “one form” rule
within fifteen years of its passage in New York.53 The Field Code
formed a sort of unofficial barrier; no territory incorporated nor state
admitted to the Union after its passage ever had separate chancery
courts, though some had separate proceedings for law and equity. Notably, when Congress officially constituted territories after the Field
Code was passed, it did not yet prescribe for the territories any specific
form of merger, but instead vested the state courts with jurisdiction in
both law and equity—the same form that federal courts used until the
passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implemented merger
on the federal level in 1938.54
An outlier in this pattern was the state of Arkansas, which initially
had a unified court system with separate law and chancery divisions but
established its first chancery court in 1855—the only state to do so after

49 Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee still had separate courts of chancery at the
time of writing. See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Court of
Chancery, DEL. CTS. (1993), https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/history.aspx [https://
perma.cc/XAM5-NP37]; About the Courts, STATE OF MISS. JUDICIARY https://courts.ms.gov
/aboutcourts/ aboutthecourts.php [https://perma.cc/4MFZ-2QG6]; About the Trial Courts,
TENN. STATE CTS., https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/circuit-criminal-chancery-courts/about
/ [https://perma.cc/BDD2-AWAP].
50 See, e.g., CODE OF ALA. § 6464 (1923); Paul S. Gillies, The Vermont Court of Chancery,
VT. BAR J., Feb. 2012, at 10, 10 (on Vermont’s 1969 merger); Simon H. Scott III & W. Everett
Lupton, Announcing a New Virginia “Civil” Union: The Marriage of Chancery and Law, VA. LAW.
REG., Feb. 2006, at 34, 35 (on Virginia’s 2006 merger).
51 See Masferrer, supra note 26, at 174 n.10.
52 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., 1851 Cal. Stat. 51 (California); 1852 Ind. Code 361, 367 (Indiana); 1852
Ohio Laws 191 (Ohio). Generally, any state which was admitted to the Union after 1848
and the passage in New York of the Field Code adopted said code as an original matter. See,
e.g., Civil Practice Act, 1866 Mont. Laws 43.
54 See, e.g., The Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 277, 280 (“[T]he said supreme and districts courts, respectively, shall possess chancery as well as common law jurisdiction.”). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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the creation of the Field Code.55 In so doing, Arkansas decided to establish a single court of chancery due in large part to the failure of the
state-run Real Estate Bank.56 The governor wanted to put the bank
into receivership in order to address the issues caused by its failure, but
the existing court system was not addressing the problem as quickly as
the governor desired.57 The legislature then established a chancery
court in Pulaski County (but nowhere else) in order to expedite the
process of establishing a receivership.58 By 1903, the legislature had
established courts of chancery around the state.59 Arkansas would retain its separate courts of chancery for longer than any other state,60
but eventually a movement began within the Arkansas bar to modernize its court system by merging its legal and equitable jurisdictions.61
Though Arkansas would ultimately abolish its chancery courts by constitutional amendment in 2001,62 it is important to note that the Arkansas fusionists did not argue that the chancery courts were harmful
or inefficient, merely that they were antiquated.63
Florida, too, evidently found the need to separate law and equity
rather than fuse them. Florida adopted the Field Code in 1870, but
then repealed it just three years later.64 The historical record is conspicuously unclear as to the exact reason for the sudden about-face.65

55 See Morton Gitelman, The First Chancery Court in Arkansas, 55 ARK. HIST. Q. 357, 357
(1996). See also notes 42–49 and accompanying text.
56 Gitelman, supra note 55, at 365.
57 Id. at 370, 372.
58 Id. at 373, 381.
59 Gitelman, supra note 11, at 240–41.
60 Not including, of course, those states which still have separate courts of chancery.
See supra note 49.
61 For examples of scholarly works calling for merger in Arkansas, see Gitelman supra
note 11, at 247; Watkins, supra note 12, at 402.
62 ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 6.
63 See sources cited supra note 63.
64 Patrick O. Gudridge, Essay, Florida Constitutional Theory (for Clifford Alloway), 48 U.
MIA. L. REV. 809, 879 (1994). See also Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of Committee on Uniform System of
Legal Procedure, 5 AM. LAW. 259, 262 (1897) (“In Florida . . . [a] noteworthy feature is that
the Field Code was adopted in 1869, and meeting with no favor was repealed in 1873. This
is the only instance of such repeal which has been brought to our notice.”).
65 The author could not locate any scholarly articles nor any legislative history from
the interim period discussing the merger of law and equity in Florida at all, let alone detailing its failings or other issues. The most apt contemporaneous reference seems to be from
the 1897 ABA Committee Report, saying simply that the Code “[met] with no favor.” See
Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 64, at 262. The lack of information around this issue is illustrated
rather strikingly by the fact that the ABA Report incorrectly relayed the year in which the
Field Code was enacted in Florida. See id. (listing the year of passage as 1869). Contra S.
JOURNAL, 3d Sess., at 83 (Fla. 1870) (establishing that the bill had not yet been passed by
the Florida Senate as of January 21, 1870). It is possible that the Field Code was repealed
due to general anti-Reconstruction sentiment, due to the Code’s strong association with
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Later attempts to institute Field Code-style modernizations in Florida
were met with resistance by the state supreme court, which found that
it did not have the authority to regulate its own forms of proceedings.66
Florida’s supreme court explicitly cited the distinction between law
and equity as a reason that it could not institute these modernizing
reforms.67 This meant that Florida did not institute the “one form”
rule until 1967, following an explicit legislative grant of rulemaking
authority to the Florida Supreme Court.68
Even among states which enacted partial mergers, there was some
resistance to fuse completely. One of these states, Iowa, adopted the
“one form” rule in 1860, but also established that equitable proceedings are different from “ordinary” proceedings.69 Iowa achieved this
by creating separate “ordinary” and equitable dockets, and the Code
explicitly allowed for an action to be moved to the appropriate docket
if it happened to be filed on the wrong one.70 Iowa’s reason for creating this unusual split system was that the state legislature believed that
the United States Constitution required separate equity and law jurisdictions, according to a report made by the Iowa committee tasked
with researching a civil code.71 The committee itself disagreed with
this contention, arguing that the distinction was substantive rather
than procedural, and grounding its analysis in the history of chancery
in England72:
Inasmuch as all rights were included as legal or equitable, and both
were needed to make the sum of justice, it was deemed best to use
both lest it might be thought that while a man’s right to sue for
damages was secured to him by the constitution, his right to ask for
a specific performance of a contract was not. 73

New York. See E-mail from Tech. Servs. Libr., Fla. Sup. Ct. Libr., to Brooks Chupp, Notre
Dame L. Sch. (Nov. 9, 2021) (on file with author). In fact, Florida had repealed laws before
and would repeal laws after its repeal of the Field Code for this exact reason. Id.
66 See Herbert S. Phillips, Should the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure Be Adopted in Florida?,
26 ABA J. 873, 875 (1940).
67 Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass’n for Adoption of Rules for Prac. and Proc., 21 So. 2d.
605, 609 (Fla. 1945) (en banc).
68 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.1040.
69 REVISION OF 1860, supra note 23, at 440–48.
70 Id. at 443–48.
71 Id. at 447.
72 Id. at 447–48. The history that the commission provides is extremely dubious. Compare id., with JOHN BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 105–25 (Oxford
Univ. Press 5th ed. 2019).
73 REVISION OF 1860, supra note 23, at 448.
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Regardless of the committee’s position, the state legislature never
changed its position, and Iowa maintains this process of handling suits
at equity to the present day.74
Like Iowa, South Carolina has formally merged law and equity in
accordance with the Field Code, but it maintains an unusual distinction that in practice keeps law and equity separated. The office of
“master-in-equity,” established prior to the signing of the Declaration
of Independence,75 was not one where the holder was a judge, but rather a referee, to whom circuit court judges could send cases.76 In most
respects, though, a master-in-equity would have the same powers as any
other judge sitting in equity.77 Prior to South Carolina’s merger of law
and equity, the master-in-equity was evidently a very constrained office,
possibly only allowed to exist in Charleston (though there is some uncertainty over this).78
When South Carolina merged law and equity, it did not officially
disestablish this office, though it also made very clear that all cases
pending in chancery at the time of passage were to be moved to the
Courts of Common Pleas.79 However, ten years after merger, the state
legislature reversed course, abolishing trial by referee and officially
reestablishing the office of master-in-equity in the counties of Charleston, Orangeburg, and Richland.80 In the following years, the South
Carolina legislature evidently could not decide whether it wanted masters-in-equity or referees, at times expanding the masters-in-equity law
74 See IOWA CODE §§ 611.3, 611.4 (2022); Garrett v. Colton, 896 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2017) (unpublished table decision) (“Joinder of legal and equitable causes is not forbidden by our present rules of civil procedure, but our statutes still recognize two kinds of
civil proceedings—ordinary and equitable.” (quoting First Nat’l Bank in Sioux City v. Curran, 206 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Iowa 1973))).
75 See Jasper M. Cureton, S.C. Ct. of Appeals, History of the Office of the Master-inEquity in South Carolina, Speech to the Equity Court Council of South Carolina (May 15,
1998) (transcript available at https://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments/master-in-equity/history.php [https://perma.cc/S4R4-3NKB]) (mentioning reference to the office being found in an act passed in 1746).
76 See H. Guyton Murrell & Reginald P. Corley, Master of His Domain: The Equity Court—
Yesterday and Today, S.C. LAW., Mar. 2009, at 27, 27 (quoting a case where the court held
that the master-in-equity was “nothing more than an ancillary to the judges, by performing
the minor duties of the court, where no legal talent or exercise of the mind is required[,]”
and further analogizing the office to that of sheriff (first quoting Hunt v. Elliott, 8 S.C. Eq.
(1 Bail. Eq.) 90, 91 (1830); and then citing Houseal v. Gibbes, 8 S.C. Eq. (1 Bail. Eq.) 482,
484 (1831))); Hal S. Robinson & Daniel J. Crooks III, Master-in-Equity 101: A Primer, S.C.
LAW., Mar. 2009, at 34, 36 (mentioning that masters-in-equity can be constrained at the
whim of the circuit court judge who refers the case).
77 See Robinson & Crooks III, supra note 76, at 36.
78 See Cureton, supra note 75.
79 Id. (noting that the 1870 Code of procedure still allowed for trial by referees but
arguing that it nonetheless disestablished the office of master-in-chancery).
80 See Act of Mar. 22, 1878, No. 537, 1878 S.C. Acts 608, 608–10.
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to the whole state, at times abolishing it and returning to the referee
system.81 In 1973, it looked as though the office of master-in-equity
would be permanently abolished, after the South Carolina Constitution was amended to overhaul the judicial system.82 In 1976, the state
legislature officially abolished the office (with the abolition to take effect in 1979), along with several other inferior courts.83 However, due
to substantial organizing and lobbying from the legal community, the
state legislature reestablished the office a mere fifteen days after it was
abolished.84
Today, South Carolina law requires a master-in-equity to be appointed in any county with a population of at least 130,000.85 The master-in-equity now has all the powers of any circuit court judge, including the power to enter final judgments.86 Even though this arrangement resembles a separate court of chancery, masters-in-equity are substantially limited in their jurisdiction. For example, though the Code
refers to an “equity court,” this “court” is not truly a separate court but
merely a division of the circuit court.87 Despite having all the powers
of a judge, masters-in-equity still retain many of the limitations imposed on the office. For example, masters-in-equity are not life-tenured but serve only for a term of six years.88 They can be either fulltime or part-time masters, and interestingly, part-time masters may still
practice law, so long as they do not appear in front of any other masters-in-equity.89 Further, masters-in-equity still may only obtain jurisdiction over a case when a circuit judge refers it to them.90
Among states which fused law and equity, Illinois presents a particularly interesting case. Illinois refused to follow the reformist trend
of its neighboring states during the period immediately following New
York’s passage of the Field Code, causing its judicial system, and particularly its system of pleadings, to appear outdated and ancient by
comparison.91 For example, even after the turn of the twentieth century, bills in chancery were still required to end with the phrase “[a]nd
your Orator will ever pray, etc.” where the et cetera replaced “for the
salvation of your Lordship’s soul,” a recitation that dated back to the

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

See Cureton, supra note 75.
See S.C. CONST. art. V.
See Cureton, supra note 75; Murrell & Corley, supra note 76, at 28.
See Cureton, supra note 75; Murrell & Corley, supra note 76.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-10 (2022).
Id. § 14-11-15.
Id.
Id. § 14-11-20.
Id.
Robinson & Crooks III, supra note 76, at 36.
See Harry N. Gottlieb, Illinois Civil Procedure, 19 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 342, 358 (1941).
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early days of the English Court of Chancery.92 Illinois undertook several reforms of its judicial system over the years, but it retained the old
system of writ pleading and a system of separate pleadings for law and
equity until 1933.93 Leading up to the passage of the Civil Practice Act
of 1933, Illinois took a patient, scholarly approach to the modernization of its pleadings, as it (1) took four years to pass a bill after the
Chicago Bar Association created a committee to research “alleged defects in the operation of [Illinois] courts,”94 and (2) sought out leading
academic scholars to consult on the drafting of the Act.95 This Act
overhauled the Illinois judiciary in all aspects, not merely pleadings
and procedure.96 Illinois specifically declined to adopt the Field Code
due to defects it perceived in its drafting, and the Code of Civil Procedure that was ultimately codified in 1933 was therefore less radical than
the supporters of merger thought wise.97 Illinois did institute a version
of the “one form” rule,98 but it retained several distinctions between
law and equity nevertheless.99 Whether or not Illinois’ approach is distinct from the way in which other states functioned is a matter of scholarly debate,100 but it is generally agreed that the text of the Illinois

92 Id. at 357 (quoting Horace Kent Tenney, Equity Practice, 11 CHI. BAR ASS’N REC.
188, 191 (1928)).
93 Illinois passed Practice Acts in 1819, 1827, 1845, 1872, and 1907, each of which
enacted certain modernizing reforms. Id. at 348–58 (describing the various reforms).
94 See id. at 359.
95 See id. at 361 & 361 n.19 (describing how Professor Edson Sunderland, alongside
the University of Michigan’s Legal Research Institute, consulted on and eventually wrote
the first draft of the Civil Practice Act of 1933).
96 Id. at 364–67.
97 For an example of criticisms of the manner in which Illinois merged law and equity,
see Charles E. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211 (1933) (“A
major difficulty, it is feared, will be found in the gingerliness, not to say timidity, with which
the draftsmen have approached the fundamental question of the abolition of forms of action and the union of law and equity.”).
98 See Gottlieb, supra note 91, at 364; see JONES ILLINOIS STATUTES ANNOTATED 672–
74 (Palmer D. Edmunds ed., 1935) (establishing that actions requesting relief both at law
and in chancery were to be heard as a “single equitable cause of action” and that they would
be “decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of equity.”).
99 The Civil Practice Act of 1930 instructed lawyers to mark actions as being either “at
law” or “in chancery,” despite the abolition of distinct forms of action, see id. at 672–73, and
allowed plaintiffs to sever legal claims from equitable claims and have them tried at law and
in equity, respectively, see id. at 674–75.
100 Dean Clark was of the opinion that Illinois’ reforms were behind other states. See
Clark, supra note 97, at 211–12 (contending that the Field Code went much farther in abolishing the distinction between law and equity than did the Illinois Civil Practice Act of
1930). However, Palmer Edmunds argues that New York still functionally recognized a difference between law and equity even if the Code said otherwise. See Palmer D. Edmunds,
Note to the Civil Practice Act of 1933 and Rules of the Supreme Court, in JONES ILLINOIS STATUTES
ANNOTATED, supra note 98, at 13, 14 (“[W]hile only one form of civil action is authorized
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statute does not go as far as the Field Code.101 Edson Sunderland, a
professor at the University of Michigan Law School and one of the
principal drafters of the Civil Practice Act of 1933, defended the Act
vigorously from its critics.102 Sunderland contended, among other
things, that Illinois’ merger of legal and equitable procedure was implemented in a “more direct and less technical way” than in the Field
Code.103
Illinois’ implementation of the merger of law and equity was seen
as a frustrating half-measure by many legal observers at the time.104 Indeed, Dean Charles Clark of Yale Law School, when asked by the University of Chicago Law Review to comment on it, was blunt in his criticism, arguing that Illinois’ nonmerger was anything but:
A major difficulty, it is feared, will be found in the gingerliness, not
to say timidity, with which the draftsmen have approached the fundamental question of the abolition of forms of action and the union
of law and equity. In their basic enactment they seem to say that
only the nomenclature of the forms of actions is dispensed with,
while separate procedures in law and equity are to be maintained.
On the other hand, provisions later for free joinder of all sorts of
claims and for the shifting of actions from one docket to another
are at war with such a purpose. . . . One can hope that the Illinois
judiciary will ignore the blind provisions as to the abolition of forms
and will achieve a simplified procedure through whole-hearted application of the joinder rules.105

Despite Clark’s criticism, Illinois followed some of its Midwestern
neighbors in abolishing form pleading and separate courts without fusing procedure totally. In 1941, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
that procedure was not totally fused in Frank v. Salomon, saying, while
analyzing the Civil Practice Act of 1933, “[c]onsidering together all the
provisions quoted, it was the obvious intention to do away with forms
of pleading but to preserve separate procedure in law and equity.”106

under the New York statute, it still remains a fact that in professional and judicial thought
there is a clear distinction between actions at law and suits at equity.”).
101 See Clark, supra note 97, at 212. Contra Edson R. Sunderland, Analysis of the Civil
Practice Act of 1933, in JONES ILLINOIS STATUTES ANNOTATED 18, 19 (1935) (“Uniform procedure in law and equity has been provided so far as possible, and this has been done in
most cases by making the equity rules applicable to both types of proceedings.”).
102 Sunderland made remarks to various groups of Illinois lawyers and published several scholarly articles on the matter. See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 101; Edson R. Sunderland, Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 28 ILL. L. REV. 861 (1934).
103 Sunderland, supra note 101, at 19.
104 See Clark, supra note 97, at 212; Roger L. Severns, Equity and “Fusion” in Illinois, 18
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 333, 370 (1940).
105 Clark, supra note 97, at 211.
106 34 N.E.2d 424, 426 (Ill. 1941).
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Much like Iowa’s legislature before it, Illinois’ supreme court cited the
constitutional right to a trial by jury as the primary reason for the continued separation of legal and equitable proceedings.107
The drafters of the Civil Practice Act seemed to concur. Edward
Hinton, a drafter of the code and law professor at the University of
Chicago, remarked that the Field Code attempted to “do the impossible, that is, to abolish the distinction between legal and equitable actions.”108 Professor Hinton further argued that as long as law and equity continued to coexist, there would be “inherent differences which
can not be wiped out by legislative fiat.”109 Professor Sunderland
noted, in remarks made to the Chicago Bar Association in March of
1934, that “[t]he great tragedy of English jurisprudence” was the fact
that law and equity had developed different forms of pleading.110 He
further concluded that the “essential problems of pleading” are identical in all cases, because no matter what kind of suit is before the court,
all that a pleading must provide in order to be effective is (1) the
names of the parties who need to appear before the court, and (2) the
nature of the controversy.111 Illinois thus, contrary to Dean Clark’s
charge, enacted the greatest possible modernizing reform allowed by
both the federal Constitution and its own state constitution.
Illinois has not substantively changed its stance on merger since it
passed the Civil Procedure Act of 1933, which suggests that Illinois
should not have any separate courts of chancery. While this is technically true, Cook County does maintain a separate Chancery Division of
its circuit court with its own separate judges, who sit by designation.112
It is noteworthy that this was done by local rule and not by statewide
act.113
III.

EQUITY MUST BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM LAW

These states, alongside Delaware, Tennessee, and Mississippi,
demonstrate persuasively that separation between law and equity is not

107 Robert Jay Nye & Jonathan D. Nye, Jury Trial in Illinois: Chancery, Multi-Remedy, and
Special Remedy Civil Cases, 22 LOY. U. L.J. 625, 631 (1991).
108 Edward W. Hinton, Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 580,
580 (1934).
109 Id.
110 Sunderland, supra note 102, at 864.
111 Id. at 865.
112 See Chancery Division, THE STATE OF ILL. CIR. CT. OF COOK CNTY., http://
www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/CountyDepartment/ChanceryDivision
[https://perma.cc/U9WG-UA8W] (noting that the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County is established pursuant to General Order 1.2, 2.1 (b) of the General Orders
of the Circuit Court of Cook County).
113 Id.
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the great tragedy that the fusionists argued it would be. But merely
that there is no reason for fusion is not enough reason to undo it, in no
small part because most states have already fused their courts. It would
be costly to separate them again, to say nothing of the costs to the legal
system as lawyers and judges alike would have to learn how to navigate
a new system. But fusion is not just unnecessary—it is actively harmful.
The lack of sophistication around equity caused by imposing equity
jurisdiction on generalist judges has led to substantial misapplication
of equitable remedies. Further, making every trial-level judge in the
country a chancellor exacerbates the concerns that many fusionists
had about different chancellors having wildly different standards for
relief.
Some form of equity is necessary to a system of laws.114 One of the
first recorded philosophers to propose a system of equity was Aristotle,
born over a thousand years before England would create its Court of
Chancery.115 The argument that equity is “a prerogative of the king
that ha[s] no place in a democratic society” is thus simply incorrect—
it was invented before the English crown was ever even a thought.116
But even beyond that, the peculiar English system of equity as was embodied in the English Court of Chancery is still indelibly intertwined
with the American legal system today. Even in jurisdictions that purport to have abolished the distinction between law and equity, the distinction between legal and equitable remedies remains.117 This distinction is not merely a dead letter; courts will consider it when determining whether to award relief typically thought of as equitable.118 Because
our legal system maintains these distinctions—and, if the reasoning in
Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge is correct,119 it may be constitutionally
required to do so—it is important that those who interpret our laws
and dispense justice understand what these remedies are, in order to
dispense them fairly.
Furthermore, equity is not an easy area of justice to define, which
makes it all the harder for generalist judges to understand and apply it
fairly. This is not made any easier to answer by the substantial overlap
114 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 114–15 (discussing Aristotle’s conception of equity as a
means of compensating for gaps in written laws, and the adoption of this justification by
English jurists).
115 Id.
116 See Watkins, supra note 12, at 403.
117 Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 540–50
(2016).
118 See id. at 544–45; see also United States v. Texas, 566 F. Supp. 3d 605, 645 (W.D. Tex.
2021) (“[A]n injunction is appropriate where required by the ‘ends of justice’: where ‘the
remedy in equity could alone furnish relief.’” (quoting Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 74, 79 (1866))).
119 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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between equity and law.120 States which retain specialty courts of chancery build up a corpus of opinions by the chancellors that provide even
nonspecialist appellate judges and justices with a substantial number
of equitable analyses to which they can refer when ruling on matters
of law pertaining to equity.121 The value of creating specialty courts to
deal with particularly intricate or specialized areas of the law is not lost
on the governments of the United States or the individual states, as the
existence of probate, bankruptcy, and tax courts can attest to, to name
but three.
The fusionists rarely acknowledge that this question is complex,
or even that it exists. There is some merit to the argument that equitable procedure does not need to be substantially different than legal
procedure, but it spares not a thought for the complexities it leaves
behind. Even Dean Clark, the staunch defender of fusion, acknowledged that there are some differences between law and equity:
It is true as well as obvious that equitable is not the same as legal
relief, that an injunction is not identical with a judgment for money
damages. It is likewise true and obvious that court trials and jury
trials are not identical. But further, it is true that neither the ultimate remedy to be granted nor the form of fact-finding process
used require the preservation and continuation of separate tribunals, of separate actions and of separate forms of action. 122

Clark’s argument is not unreasonable (even Sunderland agreed
with its main point),123 but what it fails to acknowledge is that the mere
fact that separate proceedings are not necessary does not mean that they
are not useful. This is not to say that the issues endemic in the courts
120 See Bray, supra note 117, at 536–37 (“Equity means many different and overlapping
things. . . . Even today, the extent and inevitability of law-equity fusion remains a topic of
debate in the United Kingdom and other common law countries.”). Professor Maitland
famously wrote that equity was so hard to define, the only adequate definition was “that
body of rules . . . which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity.” MAITLAND,
supra note 36, at 1.
121 See, e.g., Bayard v. Martin, 101 A.2d 329, 336 (Del. 1953) (“[W]e can hardly improve
upon the language of the learned Chancellor ad litem in Burton v. Willen [a case from
eighty years prior].” (citing Burton v. Willen, 33 A. 675, 680 (Del. Ch. 1872)); C.T. v. R.D.H.
(In re Adoption of D.N.T.), 843 So. 2d 690, 709 (Miss. 2003) (“On the other hand, perhaps
the learned chancellor in this case [i.e., the case at bar] said it best . . . .”).
122 Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1925).
123 See Sunderland, supra note 102, at 865 (“As a matter of fact, the essential problems
of pleading are identical in all cases, whether we call them legal or equitable. There are
just two essential matters which the pleader must deal with: first, the parties concerned
should be before the court; second, the nature of the controversy should be stated. Socalled legal actions are usually simple, because they developed in the early days of society
when life itself was simple. So-called equitable actions are usually more complex, because
they developed at later stages. But the pleading problems are identical in both.”).
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of chancery were not worthy of concern. Sunderland calls the separate
development of procedure for law and equity “[t]he great tragedy of
English jurisprudence”124 in no small part because the excessively rigid
forms of pleadings that arose around proceedings both legal and equitable were unnecessary and contrary to the very purpose of rules of
procedure; that is, to facilitate the hearing of claims.125 But Sunderland diverges with Clark principally on the question of whether the
Field Code accomplishes this goal.126 The question of whether the
Field Code simply perpetuated the same or similar excesses as the old
system did is open to debate, but perhaps the most worrisome issue
with the Code’s merger of law and equity is that it waves away the difficulty of discerning which aspects of equity and law jurisprudence are
“procedural” (and hence unnecessary) and which aspects are “substantive” (and hence should be left alone).
Ideally, any defects in a merger enacted via a code of civil procedure could be mitigated by careful work by judges, but the very nature
of merger makes this a difficult task.127 The advantage to having
124 Id. at 864.
125 See id. at 863 (“The rules are enacted for the definite purpose of facilitating litigation. That purpose certainly ought to be more important than the letter of the rules. The
difficulty with legal practice has always been that it becomes hidebound and technical, and
loses its elasticity.”).
126 Sunderland observed wryly that he estimated that the Field Code had cost the people of the State of New York $100 million “merely to find out what it means, through litigation over questions of procedure.” Id. at 864. Clark, for his part, attributed this to recalcitrant New York judges who refused to allow the Code to work as intended, even going so
far as to judicially overwrite them with the old rules. Clark, supra note 122, at 3 (“The cold,
not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from the New York judges is
matter of history. They had been bred under the common law rules of pleading and taught
to regard that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a system
which was heralded as so simple that every man would be able to draw his own pleadings.
They proceeded by construction to impart into the Code rules and distinctions from the
common law system to such an extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it
that it could hardly be recognized by its creators.” (quoting McArthur v. Moffett, 128 N.W.
445, 446 (Wis. 1910))).
127 Judge Harry Fisher, a circuit judge in Chicago and a member of the Cook County
Judicial Advisory Council, presciently observed that even unified court systems would “necessarily divide [their] work into various departments with judges . . . assigned to each, according to their experience and special fitness” because it would allow judges to become
experts in their chosen fields, thus increasing the quality of their decisions and reducing
the need for appeals. See Harry M. Fisher, The Judicial Structure of Cook County, 36 ILL. L.
REV. NW. U. 628, 638–39 (1942). Judge Fisher wrote of his concern that the completely
unified court system that Cook County had, at the time of his writing, created massive delays
because cases that certain judges could handle in a matter of “at most, hours” were being
given to other judges who viewed them as “complicated problem[s] consuming days of
[their] time in reaching the proper solution.” Id. at 639. See also Severns, supra note 104,
at 342–43 (saying that the expectation that judges be chancellors when hearing cases in
equity and not when hearing cases in law “caused trouble”).
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separate courts of equity and law is that it allowed certain judges (that
is, chancellors) to specialize in equity. Why is specialization important?
Because equity was not historically the same as the common law, but
was guided by “traditional principles of equity,” which the Supreme
Court has affirmed must still govern how American judges dispense
equity today.128 These “traditional principles” were developed and
honed through cases back through the establishment of the English
Court of Chancery in the 1300s. It is only through the rigorous understanding and application of these principles that equity can avoid subsuming the law and rendering “the whole legal system . . . incertain.”129
Joseph Story, in his seminal treatise on equity, expressed this very concern. Story argued that, in order to avoid “an arbitrary discretion in
the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents.”130 Alexander Hamilton sought to assuage such
concerns by pointing out that equity courts were meant to give relief
primarily “in extraordinary cases.”131 He further argued that equity
was no longer the freewheeling field of law that it was in its youth, as
“the principles by which that relief is governed are now reduced to a
regular system.”132
However, the transformation of each trial court judge into a chancellor places a great deal of strain on these restraints. Consider the
now-controversial case of the “universal” or “nationwide” injunction,
i.e., an injunction restraining the defendant’s behavior against the
whole world, not merely the plaintiff. Such an injunction did not exist
under the principles established by the English court of chancery.133
And yet, these injunctions are issued with frightening regularity, especially when it comes to enjoining the federal government from enacting some manner of policy that touches upon a political flash point.134
128 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–19
(1999) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2941 (2d ed. 1995)).
129 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 1785), reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 67, 71 (Julian P. Boyd & Mina R. Bryan eds., Princeton Univ.
Press 1954) (1785) (footnote omitted).
130 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 17, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton); see 1 STORY,
supra note 7, at 15–17.
131 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 17, at 505 (emphasis omitted).
132 Id.
133 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Samuel
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418
(2017).
134 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1161 (D. Haw. 2017) (ordering
that the named defendants “hereby are enjoined fully from enforcing or implementing
[portions of Proclamation No. 9645, prohibiting entry into the United States by nationals
of certain foreign countries] across the Nation” (emphasis added)); Texas v. United States,
201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (enjoining the federal government from
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The extreme willingness of federal courts to issue such broad-based
injunctions has encouraged the practice of forum-shopping,135 lending
a substantial weight to the concerns of English lawyer John Selden, who
once decried equity for the inherent arbitrariness between different
chancellors’ personal standards:
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have measure, know what to
trust too. Equity is according to ye conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as it is larger or narrower so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if
they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a
Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would be this. One
Chancellor has a long foot another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; ‘tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s Conscience. 136

Justice Story further noted that, if judges sitting in equity were to
discard prior precedents and limiting principles, it would “literally
place the whole rights and property of the community under the arbitrary will of the judge, acting, if you please, arbitrio boni judicis, . . . according to his own notions and conscience; but still acting with a despotic and sovereign authority.”137 If questions of equity were given not
to judges acting as part-time chancellors, but rather to experts in the
field of equity, one imagines that thorny issues like the nationwide injunction would be handled with greater elegance and thought.
More fundamental than the concern that judges may not understand equity well enough to apply it within its appointed bounds is the
question of what those bounds even are. In Liu v. SEC, the Supreme
Court was presented with the question of whether disgorgement was
an equitable power allowed to federal courts under Grupo Mexicano.138
The Court held that it was, on the grounds that even though disgorgement called as such had only appeared relatively recently, the idea of
forcing a wrongdoer to give up profits that he had gained through inequitable behavior was substantially older.139 The Court held that the
restriction on this remedy was not in its type, but in its scope.140 But
the Court was not unanimous in so holding. Justice Thomas, the lone
“initiating, continuing, or concluding any investigation based on Defendants’ interpretation that the definition of sex includes gender identity in Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex,” without limiting the relief to cases concerning the named
plaintiffs).
135 See Bray, supra note 133, at 457–61.
136 Fowler, supra note 46, at 25–26 (quoting TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick
Pollock ed., 1927)).
137 1 STORY, supra note 7, at 21.
138 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020).
139 Id. at 1942–43 (pointing to scholarly works on “accounting,” “restitution,” and “unjust enrichment,” all of which were equitable remedies forcing a defendant to relinquish
illicit gain).
140 Id. at 1946.
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dissenter, argued that disgorgement was purely an invention of the
twentieth century, and that it was too vague to even plausibly be a “traditional equitable remedy.”141 He proceeds by noting that courts’ use
of the term “disgorgement” changed over time, starting as a “colloquial[]” reference to what they were ordering defendants to do and
eventually becoming a discrete judicial remedy in its own right by the
1970s.142 Justice Thomas emphasizes that his opinion is based on the
same concerns that Founding-era critics of equity raised.143 It is perhaps telling that one of the precedents on which the court relies notes
the substantial overlap between remedies at law and remedies at equity, and hence the importance of making it clear which is which.144
Roscoe Pound felt that equity began to become “decaden[t]”
when it was subjected to “the common law theory of binding precedents and resulting case-law equity.”145 Pound thought that the point
of equity was to escape the “mechanical” nature of the operation of
law, and the introduction of the Field Code was simply the coup de grâce
on the idea of equity as a separate doctrine, formalizing equity’s subjugation to the mechanical aspects of common law.146 Pound therefore
considered the Field Code an unqualified good, because without any
of the beneficial aspects of equity left, arguing “against the fusion of
law and equity to-day is no less futile than were the ponderous arguments of the sixteenth century sergeant-at-law who inveighed against
chancery in his ‘replication’ to Doctor and Student.”147 However, these
facts could be interpreted equally to weigh in the opposite direction:
if “[l]aw must be tempered with equity,” why would it not make equal
sense to “fight for equity” within the current system instead of surrendering to Pound’s so-called decadence?148

141 Id. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Disgorgement is not a traditional form of
equitable relief. Rather, cases, legal dictionaries, and treatises establish that it is a 20thcentury invention. As an initial matter, it is not even clear what ‘disgorgement’ means . . .
[which] is the first sign that it is not a historically recognized equitable remedy.”).
142 See id. at 1952.
143 Id. at 1954 (“[T]he Founders accepted federal equitable powers only because those
powers depended on traditional forms. The Constitution was ratified on the understanding
that equity was ‘a precise legal system’ with ‘specific equitable remed[ies].’” (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 127 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (alteration in original)).
144 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 266 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (“In
some instances, there was jurisdiction both in law and in equity and it was generally (although not universally) acknowledged that the beneficiary could elect between his or her
legal and equitable remedies.”).
145 Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 25 (1905).
146 Id. at 20, 25.
147 Id. at 35 (quoting 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
322 (Francis Hargrave ed., Dublin, Lynch et al. ed. 1787))
148 Id.
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CONCLUSION149
The powers of equity are substantial, and improper applications
of these powers formed the basis for some of the earliest objections to
the institution of courts of chancery in the United States.150 But as Aristotle observed, equity in some form is necessary for robust systems of
law.151 The abolition of separate courts makes these powers much easier to abuse, because it becomes nearly impossible for judges to keep
the substantive concepts separate.152 Brutus worried about what might
result from judicial overreach before the foundation of the United
States, and even now scholars still write about such concerns.153 Fusion
has exacerbated the problem of overreach, as the ahistorical application of the equitable injunction has shown. Reinstating separate chancery courts would help rein in the judiciary by allowing judges to specialize in equity and become expert the principles that guide it.

149 There would, of course, be costs inherent in separating the courts after they have
been merged for almost two hundred years. It is beyond the scope of this Note to make
specific implementation proposals, but there are certainly cost-limiting measures that states
could take, like establishing courts of equity not by county, but by groups of counties.
150 Katz, supra note 12, at 276 (discussing the abuse of colonial chancery powers to
collect substantial quitrents for the Crown (quoting Letter from Governor Burnet to the
Lords of Trade (Dec. 21, 1727), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 848, 848 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons &
Co. Brodhead ed. 1855)).
151 See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
152 See Severns, supra note 104, at 355 (stating that merger “led the courts into the
usual errors of nonrecognition and refusal”).
153 See, e.g., Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional
Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 195 (2002) (arguing that
a judicial exercise of its own policy preferences “would undermine the Constitution’s requirement of separation of powers”); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2002) (“If judges were to stray from their statutory
instructions and make law themselves, there would be reason to question the legitimacy of
Marbury’s holding.”).

